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In this paper, we assess the effects of the Italian labour market reforms which began
in 2001 and which led to widespread deployment of temporary work contracts. Using a
hitherto unexploited administrative dataset of work histories for the period 2003-2010,
we estimate transition probabilities in the states of non-employment and employment
and find a small positive effect on job creation, imputed to the reforms. Estimates
also indicate a large increase in transitions to temporary contracts, which offset the
reduction in permanent employment flows, although transition probabilities for men
and women explain little heterogeneity. While we do find a substitution effect of the
reforms on the transition between temporary and permanent contracts, the increased
probability of being employed in temporary jobs mostly involved young people and
workers in the depressed areas of the south of Italy.
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1. Introduction
Italy, like most European countries over the last twenty years, has introduced several reforms
to enhance labour market flexibility and promote employment. These reforms generally revised
Employment Protection Legislation, mostly providing more flexible types of contracts for new
hirings (atypical contracts), without modifying rules for workers who already had permanent (open-
end) contracts.
A large body of literature has debated the role of temporary contracts in European countries
with respect to the effects on workers’ perspectives and contractual careers (Blanchard and Landier
2002; Dolado et al. 2002; Esteva˜o 2003; Gu¨ell and Petrongolo 2007; Mourougane and Vogel 2009).
The empirical literature on the effects of flexibility in the Italian labour market focused on the Treu
Package (Law 196/1997) and showed highly variable transition probabilities between occupational
states in relation to contractual terms1. In particular, the probability of finding permanent positions
increased with contract duration and was positively influenced by the addition of training, but
decreased with the number of repeated short-term contracts and career interruptions. Most studies
in this field have also highlighted the risk of rising labour market segmentation, because less favoured
workers (young people, women, and people living in Italy’s southern regions) remained trapped in
positions of temporary employment.
However, evidence of the effects of the reform of fixed-term contracts in 2001 and of the Biagi
reform, implemented in 2003, which increased labour market flexibility more extensively, is still
scanty, and the overall influence remains unclear (Bruno et al. 2012; Cappellari et al. 2012; Picchio
and Staffolani 2013). One reason may be the long-lasting lack of adequate pre- and post-reform
data, a problem which this paper overcomes by using a hitherto unexploited panel of individual
work histories from 2003 to 2010, obtained from a joint project carried out by the Italian Treasury
and the ”Giacomo Brodolini” Foundation (the AD-SILC dataset).
We evaluate the effects of these reforms on entry into the labour market and transitions across
non-employment and employment states, in order to answer the following research questions: How
has enhanced flexibility shaped job creation and reallocation in the labour market? Have disad-
vantaged groups (young people, women, and workers in the South of Italy) been positively affected
by the spread of temporary contracts? We first estimate transition probabilities between states of
non-employment and employment (the two-state model), and then extend analysis to distinguish
temporary and permanent employment (the three-state model). Within the field of temporary em-
ployment, we also identify the specific effects of two atypical types of contracts, i.e., apprenticeships
and fixed-term contracts. We propose an estimation method based on Markov chains of order one
to account for the relative importance of each of the transition probabilities and measure the effects
of new atypical contracts on individual employment histories.
1See Barbieri and Scherer 2009; Berton et al. 2011; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007; Gagliarducci 2005; Giannelli et al.
2012; Ichino et al. 2005, 2008; Picchio 2008; Kugler and Pica 2008.
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Matching previous literature, our main results indicate a slight improvement in the probability
of entering the labour market from a state of non-employment through a temporary contract.
We also observe a significant increase in transitions to temporary employment, largely offset by a
decrease in flows to permanent employment - an empirical fact particularly evident in young workers.
When we estimate the probabilities of transition for temporary workers in initial state, the results
indicate a large increase of temporary contracts which constrains slightly the permanent contracts.
Even if these results are emphasised for apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts, especially in the
depressed areas of southern Italian regions, they remain unchanged for various socio-demographic
decomposition of workers, and under the potential caveats.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset. Section 3 gives a stylised
model for labour market employment. Section 4 presents the identification and estimation strate-
gies. Section 5 discusses the results; conclusions are made in Section 6.
2. Data
The AD-SILC database merges the dataset ”IT-SILC (2005)” provided by the Italian Institute
of Statistics (ISTAT) with the administrative archives of the Italian Institute of Social Security
(INPS). It contains the work histories of about 56,000 workers, and includes the amount of national
insurance contributions paid for each type of contract, the beginning and end dates for each contract,
data on maternity leave, accidents and/or injuries, and time off for illness. All this information,
including workers’ age, gender, date of birth, place of birth, and place of residence, are recorded as
a panel data framework; education, marital status and nationality are listed cross-sectionally for
the year 2005 by the IT-SILC dataset.
In particular, administrative data from the INPS archives merge information from the Register
of Active Workers (Casellario degli Attivi), established in 2005, and the Register of Pensioners
(Casellario dei Pensionati), introduced in 1971. The purpose of these registers is to collect social
security information on each worker and contribute to monitoring and evaluation of labour market
and social security policies. Merging registers overcomes the limitations of the previous datasets,
such as the labour force survey prepared by ISTAT (Forlani 2008), which collected information from
several sources: i) workers’ data regarding ”hiring and firing”, from the Workers’ Compensation
Authority (INAIL); ii) data on residence from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and iii) data covering
time off for injuries and illness provided by public institutions (e.g., Ministero della Sanita` Pubblica).
Data on working experience were extracted from the AD-SILC dataset, according to the
amount of national insurance contributions paid in each type of contract. Our strategy classi-
fies each worker within a given contract, when the amount of national insurance contributions paid
within that contract is prevalent, irrespective of whether the worker in question has several con-
tracts in a given year and/or different kinds of contracts. This allowed us to select the working
experiences of 22,632 employees aged between 15 and 64 for the period 2003-2010. As a partial
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limitation to the use of the dataset, workers employed by the public sector were excluded from
this analysis, since INPS does not distinguish between temporary and permanent contracts in the
public sector and private employees who retired or died during the analysed period. In addition,
we excluded self-employed workers because, during the analysed period, many laws were passed
specifically for them, complicating proper identification of the labour market reforms in which we
were interested.
Temporary jobs in the AD-SILC dataset included workers in leasing, seasonal work, work
on projects, apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts. We removed from the dataset workers on
leasing contracts, because detailed information on them was not available2. We were also obliged to
exclude seasonal workers, due to the large quantities of missing data. The sample finally comprised
17,339 individuals, for a total number of 156,364 observations within the panel framework. Table 1
reports the composition of our sample, distinguishing between non-employment and various types
of employment contracts. In particular, we considered permanent contracts and three types of
temporary contracts, i.e., work on projects, apprenticeships, and fixed-term contracts.
Work on projects (contratto di collaborazione a progetto, ”co.co.pro.”) was a novelty of the
Biagi reform (Law 30/2003), which replaced collaboration contracts (collaborazione coordinata e
continuativa, ”co.co.co.”) introduced by the so-called Treu Package (from the name of the Ministry
for Labour). Formally, workers were collaborators in a company working on a clearly defined
professional project. De facto, this type of contract turned out to play a key role in the growth of
temporary job relations and many workers ended up by providing services which were very similar
to those of permanent jobs. Despite the importance of work on projects, we could not identify its
effects after the Biagi reform, because the AD-SILC dataset merges previous co.co.co contracts,
which were still in place after that reform, with the new co.co.pro. contracts introduced in 2003.
Apprenticeship contracts3 were also reorganised by the Biagi reform, by means of several
innovations: i) an increase in the limiting age threshold (up to age 30); i) an increase in contract
duration, from a minimum of 18 months to up to six years; iii) the possibility of undergoing training
at the workplace as a substitute for external training courses; iv) introduction of various types of
training, sometimes also linked to higher education or university.
Fixed-term contracts were allowed for technical and productive reasons and in order to replace
absent workers. In 2001, Law 368, based on an EU directive, relieved employers of being obliged
to define the specific reasons for using fixed-term contracts and eliminated mandatory limits to
their renewal. Innovations in apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts were both implemented as
from 2005, and the AD-SILC dataset allows us to identify their effects (see Section 4.2). Later,
Law 247/2007 introduced changes in maximum duration (i.e., three years) for fixed-term contracts
2For an extensive discussion on leasing contract and temporary work agencies in Italy, see Ichino et al. (2005).
3Apprenticeship contracts were introduced for the first time with Law 25/1955, and are defined as contracts in
which employers are responsible for providing or arranging to provide vocational training.
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Table 1: Distribution of panel data by employment status
Employment status Number in sample
Permanent contracts 75,654
Fixed-term contracts 9,152
Work on project contracts 5,068
Apprenticeship contracts 5,413
Non-employment 61,077
Total 156,364
stipulated with each employer. However, the new reform of fixed-term contracts was only applicable
as from April 1 2009.
Lastly, the category ”non-employment” includes all subjects in the dataset who had no contract
recorded by INPS during the period of this analysis. As a limitation, the AD-SILC dataset does not
distinguish between unemployed and inactive subjects, although the available information allows
us to check the empirical analysis for instances of long-term unemployment (person unemployed
for more than one year), first-time job-seekers, and unemployed persons receiving social security
benefits or redundancy payments.
2.1. Descriptive statistics
The economic literature shows that, when legal constraints on the termination of permanent
jobs coexist with weak constraints on the creation of temporary jobs, it is profitable for firms to hire
new workers with temporary contracts. Very short-term temporary contracts are better explained
by the heterogeneity of the duration of expected production opportunities, combined with high
termination costs for permanent jobs4.
To highlight these motivations, which underlie the increased numbers of temporary contracts
in Italy, we present some empirical evidence of flows in employment status and transitions between
non-employment and temporary contracts. Figure 1 plots the outcomes from a count model which
analyses entries into the labour market from a state of non-employment. We distinguish three
duration periods for temporary contracts: less than 3.5 months, between 3.5 and 6 months, and
more than 6 months. This distinction is in line with the length of the trial period for permanent
contracts in the Italian labour market, which is specified by collective bargaining agreements as
between 1 and 6 months.
Figure 1 shows that, in 2003 and 2004, about 50% of entries into employment were permanent
4See, for example, Cahuc et al. (2012).
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Fig. 1.— Percentage transitions from non-employment to permanent and temporary employment
10
20
30
40
50
Tr
an
sit
ion
s t
o 
em
plo
ym
en
t %
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
time
Temporary contracts <3.5 months Temporary contracts 3.5-6 months
Temporary contracts >6 months Permanet contracts 
contracts, whereas this type of contract decreased by 7-8% after 2005, the year when the labour
market reforms came into effect (see next section). Restricting analysis to temporary contracts
shorter than the trial period of permanent contracts, we find that, on average, 22-23% of new
hirings were shorter than 3.5 months and 7-9% shorter than 6 months. In addition, more than 20%
of entries were for temporary jobs longer than the maximum trial period.
To investigate this point further, Table 2 lists the percentage of transitions into temporary
employment from non-employment, distinguishing among the three contract categories (work on
projects, apprenticeships, fixed-term) and durations. The results show that most of the entries
in the apprenticeship and fixed-term categories were shorter than the trial period of permanent
contracts. This is at odds with the hypothesis of temporary jobs as a screening device to hire
potential candidates for permanent positions, but is consistent with the idea that firms use tem-
porary contracts to exploit new production opportunities with short expected durations. The only
exception among temporary contracts was work on projects, which gave rise to durations longer
than six months, a result which may be explained by the specific nature of work required for these
external hirings, generally involving special skills.
3. A stylised empirical model for the labour market
Let us assume that there are N individuals indexed by i ∈ I ≡ (1; ....;N), potential participants
in the labour market. Let yi ∈ {−1; +1} denote the achievements of the employment status of
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Table 2: Percentage transitions from non-employment
to temporary employment
Duration of contract (months)
Temporary contract < 3.5 3.5− 6 > 6
Work on projects 7.15 13.10 47.603
Apprenticeship 18.88 24.27 16.44
Fixed-term contracts 73.96 62.62 35.95
worker i. In the two-state model, we assume that employment status is binary so that yi = +1 if
the worker is employed (E ), and yi = −1 if non-employed (NE ). We define an employment profile
y = (y1, ...., yN ) as the vector of the employment status of N workers. Let Ω = {−1; +1}N denote
all possible states of the employment profile so that the number of different states of Ω is given by
|Ω| = {2}N .
Employment status arises from the match between optimal choices of firms and workers, and
the observed profile depends on some key variables in the labour market. Theoretical models
investigate the main driving forces of the employment choices of firms and workers and suggest,
for example, the use of variables such as labour productivity, reservation wage, the rate at which
differing jobs become non-productive, and contract duration (Cahuc et al. 2012).
We define a stochastic employment rule through a latent surplus function, y∗i (t). This latent
function generates a positive or negative value of y∗i (t) based on the expected surplus which the
key variables of the labour market produce. This function is assumed to be linear in parameters:
y∗i = bi(x˜i) + i (1)
where x˜i ⊂ <k is the 1×K vector of individual and labour market characteristics for choices i of
firm and worker and i ∈ < is a random shock. Assuming that stochastic errors i are independent
and identically distributed, the probability that worker i is employed yi = +1, conditional on x˜i is
given by
pii [yi = +1|x˜i] =
∫
D
f(i)di (2)
where f(i) and F (i) are the density and distribution functions of shock i, respectively, and
D = i ∈ <|y∗i ≥ 0 denotes the area from which the integral is taken.
To operationalise the stochastic employment rule, we use the binary indicator function 1[−1; +1],
counting when the person involved is observed in a state of non-employment or employment. Given
the basic two-state labour market matching rule (i.e. the two-state model), we can write:
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{
yi = +1 if (y
∗
i ) ≥ 0
yi = −1 if (y∗i ) < 0
(3)
where the latent surplus function, y∗i ≥ 0, indicates the condition for the state of employment
and y∗i < 0 defines that of non-employment. Note that, the positive or negative sign of y
∗
i depends
on the interaction between the key variables of the matching labour market model.
Since a large number of temporary and permanent jobs co-exist in the labour market, the
previous rule should be extended to analyse job flows to temporary and permanent states. Thus,
we extend the stochastic rule based on the maximum expected surpluses to these two segments
of the labour market, and denote the partitioned latent surpluses as y∗i,τ and y
∗
i,P . This explicitly
implies considering two employment states, temporary (Eτ ) and permanent (EP ), together with
non-employment. We formalise the three-state binary rules (i.e., the three-state model) as follows:
{
yiτ = +1 if y
∗
i ≥ 0 and y∗iτ ≥ y∗iP
yiτ = −1 if y∗i < 0 or y∗iτ < y∗iP
(4)
{
yiP = +1 if y
∗
i ≥ 0 and y∗iτ ≤ y∗iP
yiP = −1 if y∗i < 0 or y∗iτ > y∗iP
(5)
The binary rules of models (4) and (5) which classify workers’ state in the labour market
are useful not only to evaluate the overall effects of the increase in temporary job contracts after
the Italian reforms of 2001 and 2003, but also to examine the specific effects of various kinds of
temporary jobs. We therefore replicate the three-state model, considering each temporary job, i.e.,
apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts, one by one, together with the states of non-employment
and permanent work.
We discuss this point further in the empirical section, and summarise here these hypotheses in
the corollary given below.
Corollary 1 : Given the number of temporary job contracts of interest B=2, the binary
outcome of these states, based on equation (4), are replicated according to the following composite
rule:
{
yiτ,B = +1 if y
∗
i ≥ 0 and y∗iτ,B ≥ y∗iP with B = 1, 2
yiτ,B = −1 if y∗i < 0 or y∗iτ,B < y∗iP with B = 1, 2
(6)
The binary outcome of permanent contracts (i.e. equation (5)) in this formulation is:
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{
yiP = +1 if y
∗
i ≥ 0 and y∗iP ≥ y∗iτ,B with B = 1, 2
yiP = −1 if y∗i < 0 or y∗iP < y∗iτ,B with B = 1, 2
(7)
This static representation of the probability of staying in a specific employment state gen-
erally serves as an initial state. However, as we are interested in the achievement of individual
employment, we examine the labour demand of firms and the supply of workers from a dynamic
perspective, using a stochastic process. In particular, we assume a stochastic process in which
employment-matching profiles are modelled in discrete time, t = 0, 1, 2, .... ∈ Z and, based on the
match between firms and workers (i), these profiles are updated sequentially over time.
Let y(t) ≡ (y1(t), ...., yN (t)) ∈ Ω denote an achieved matching profile. A sequence [(y(0),y(1),
y(2)...)] thus describes the evolution of a matching profile over time. The transition from one state
to another is specified as follows. We assume that a matching profile is y(t) at time t. Taking
into account the basic two-state model, a new matching profile in period t + 1 evolves from the
matching profile in period t as follows. Let x˜(t) ≡ (x˜1(t), ...., x˜N (t)) be the collection of background
characteristics of persons and firms in the labour market at time t. For each achieved matching in
Ω ∈ {−1,+1}, we have the indicator variable 1[., .](t+ 1) which determines the following rule:{
yi(t+ 1) = +1 if (y
∗
i (t+ 1)) ≥ 0
yi(t+ 1) = −1 if (y∗i (t+ 1)) < 0
(8)
The transition rule states that the employment status generated from matching in the labour
market is updated according to the conditional probability given by:
pii [yi(t+ 1) = +1|yi(t), x˜i(t)] . (9)
Since the stochastic process [(y(0),y(1),y(2)...)] described above follows a Markov chain on a
finite state space of Ω, it is easy to check that the transition probability at time t+1 is independent
of its history before t.
Clearly, interest in examining the probability of transition across employment states aims at
evaluating the effects of labour market reforms on job flows when we use the general form of the
three-state model or its decompositions, which specifically involve apprenticeships and fixed-term
contracts. However, assuming that the reforms implemented in 2001 and 2003 act directly on
atypical contracts, favouring their spread, we restrict the parameters of the transition matrix. We
identify the effects of enhanced flexibility on the transition probability of individuals in states
of non-employment and temporary employment at time t, with the expectation that this shock
increases firms’ hirings or renewals in temporary employment at time t+1.
Since the shock of the reforms does not directly affect permanent contracts, we exclude es-
timation of transition probabilities to the temporary employment of individuals with permanent
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contracts at time t in the three-state model (outcomes at t+1 ). In fact, the effects of changes in
the employment status at time t+1 of individuals in permanent employment in t would be the re-
sult of terminations and later entries into temporary employment from a state of non-employment.
That is, we assume that possible direct transitions from permanent contracts due to the reform are
negligible.
In summary, the specifications and rules shown in this section model employment status at
time t and the transition to employment status at t+ 1. In particular, the binary rule in the two-
state model serves to stylise the ”job creation” which characterises people who are non-employed
at time ”t” and transit to the state of employment at time ”t+ 1”.
Instead, we use the three-state model to estimate the transition from an initial ”non-employment”
state, (t), to potential final states (t+1). Here, ”job creation” is modelled from an initial state of
non-employment to temporary or permanent employment. The three-state model also allows us to
define ”job reallocation” characterised by transition from one temporary job to another temporary
job, to a permanent position or to non-employment at time t+1.
Figure 2 shows the pay offs of the transition matrix according to the stochastic matching rules
and assumptions of the three-state model.
Fig. 2.— Payoff of the transition matrix in the three state model
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Initial state (yt) Final state (yt+1) Latent variable conditions
1[ 1; .]t =)
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1[ 1 ; . , . ]t+1 if y⇤i (t+ 1) < 0
1[. ; +1⌧ ; .]t+1 if y
⇤
i (t+ 1) > 0 and y
⇤
i⌧ (t+ 1) > y
⇤
iP (t+ 1)
1[. ; . ; +1P]t+1 if y
⇤
i (t+ 1) > 0 and y
⇤
i⌧ (t+ 1)  y⇤iP (t+ 1)
1[ . ; +1⌧ ]t =)
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1[ 1 ; . , . ]t+1 if y⇤i (t+ 1) < 0
1[. ; +1⌧ ; .]t+1 if y
⇤
i (t+ 1) > 0 and y
⇤
i⌧ (t+ 1) > y
⇤
iP (t+ 1)
1[. ; . ; +1P]t+1 if y
⇤
i (t+ 1) > 0 and y
⇤
i⌧ (t+ 1)  y⇤iP (t+ 1)
(10)
4. The e↵ects of Italian labour market reforms: methodological issues
4.1. Outcome and explanatory variables
Given our panel data, we update the notation for empirical implementation of our models. The
outcome (or dependent) variable for worker’s achievement i is that person’s history, i.e., transition
times and destination states. Let Ti,0 and yi,0 denote the point in time when that history begins
and the initial state, respectively. In this application, Ti,0 is the first year of panel data (i.e. 2003)
and yi,0 is the variable representing achievement of indicator function 1[ 1;+1] in non-employment
or employment states at time 0.
Let Ti,j and yi,j for j = 1, 2, ..8, denote subsequent transition times and destination states
(with Ti,j 1 < Ti,j and yi,j 1 6= yi,j). Individual history is observed over period [Ti,0, Ti,T ], where
Ti,T represents the time of the last year of panel data (i.e. 2010). Ni is the number of transitions
during [Ti,0, Ti,T ].
Distinction must be made in the notation between exogenous and endogenous explanatory
variables. yi(t) denotes the history of outcomes from the onset of time until time t (the matching
profile); that is, yi(t) = {Ti,j}Ji(t)j=0 , where Ji(t) is the maximal integer, so that Ti,Ji(t)  t. Letexi denotes a vector of exogenous explanatory variables at time t for worker i. For the sake of
generality, we omit the possibility that covariates are time-variant or time-invariant, although we
separate their di↵erent influences below.
Notes: y∗ is the latent surplus function based in Equation 1, while 1[., .] and 1[., ., .] are the indicator variables at time t and
t+1. Bold number is the labour employment state achieved.
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4. The effects of Italian labour market reforms: methodological issues
4.1. Outcome and explanatory variables
Given our panel data, we update the notation for empirical implementation of our models. The
outcome (or dependent) variable for worker’s achievement i is that person’s history, i.e., transition
times and destination states. Let Ti,0 and yi,0 denote the point in time when that history begins
and the initial state, respectively. In this application, Ti,0 is the first year of panel data (i.e. 2003)
and yi,0 is the variable representing achievement of indicator function 1[−1; +1] in non-employment
or employment states at time 0.
Let Ti,j and yi,j for j = 1, 2, ..8, denote subsequent transition times and destination states
(with Ti,j−1 < Ti,j and yi,j−1 6= yi,j). Individual history is observed over period [Ti,0, Ti,T ], where
Ti,T represents the time of the last year of panel data (i.e. 2010). Ni is the number of transitions
during [Ti,0, Ti,T ].
Distinction must be made in the notation between exogenous and endogenous explanatory
variables. yi(t) denotes the history of outcomes from the onset of time until time t (the matching
profile); that is, yi(t) = {Ti,j}Ji(t)j=0 , where Ji(t) is the maximal integer, so that Ti,Ji(t) ≤ t. Let
x˜i denotes a vector of exogenous explanatory variables at time t for worker i. For the sake of
generality, we omit the possibility that covariates are time-variant or time-invariant, although we
separate their different influences below.
The main aim of this paper is to distinguish the effect of labour market reforms to enhance
flexibility in Italy from other factors such as state dependence, personal and firm characteristics,
and unobserved heterogeneity. We thus include the effects of labour market reforms in the potential
outcome approach and explicitly consider them on the transition probabilities related to the states
of non-employment and employment. Thus, we decompose vector x˜i into a xi(t) vector of covariates
and a binary exogenous variable, s[0;1], which captures the exposure of a subject to the reforms.
4.2. Identification strategy
In this section, we discuss the empirical strategy restricting the exogenous source of variation
in the labour market to apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts, for which we have information
suitable for identification. Following Cappellari et al. (2012), we exploit the progressive implemen-
tation of the reforms in various sectors and regions of Italy, to identify the causal effects of these
policies on job creation and reallocation.
The apprenticeship reform resulting from the new legislation was only gradually implemented,
because specific regulations were issued by each Italian region. This was slow, so that in 2005 the
government stated that, in the absence of regional regulations, collective agreements at sectoral
level could specify the training content of contracts. This produced two tracks before the new ap-
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prenticeship contract could be adopted, one covering regional guidelines and the other implemented
by sector-specific collective agreements. Figure 3 shows the timelines of regional applications and
sector-specific collective agreements for apprenticeships in our sample period.
Fig. 3.— Timeline of implementation of apprenticeship contracts (Law 30/2003).
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Similarly, the adoption of the new fixed-term contracts (Law 368/2001) was conditional upon
renewal of collective agreements. Figure 4 shows the timeline for their renewal at sectoral level,
which began in 2005. Conversely, we assume as negligible the effects of the later Law 247/2007,
which introduced a maximum duration of three years for fixed-term contracts because, as mentioned
above, it was not applied until April 1 2009. However, we explore possible effects in the section on
robustness analysis, constraining sample length to 2008.
Fig. 4.— Timeline of implementation of reform of fixed-term contracts (Law 368/2001).
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4.3. Parameterisation and estimation
In this sub-section, we discuss the estimation procedure to evaluate the effects of the labour
market reforms on labour market performance. Following the framework presented above, we
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specify as in French and Bailey (2011) a linear probability model (LPM ) which rationalises the
dynamic matching employment rules of the two-state and three-state models. As yi,t is the binary
outcome of interest, si,t is binary treatment (s is the binary indicator variable) which represents a
formal inclusion of the exogenous variation in employment matching between t and t+1. To make
the model empirically tractable, we also distinguish column vector k of time-invarying covariates
vi from time-varying covariates, xI−k,t.
Following the potential outcome approach, transition probability outcome y has a potential
version denoted by y(s). For any subject, the observed outcome is the potential outcome cor-
responding to the observed treatment in the labour market. This basic assumption is known as
the observation rule (Lechner and Miquel 2010) or the consistency assumption (VanderWeele and
Vansteelandt 2009).
A formulation of the LPM which accounts for the relationship between potential outcome y(s)
and treatment indicator s, is given by:
E
[
(y(t+ 1)|y(t))(s)
]
= β0 + (s)
′β1, (10)
where β0 represents the potential outcome mean, β1 is the average treatment effect under
identification assumptions, and s the exposure of a subject at time t to the labour market re-
forms. We invoke the general assumptions for causal estimation of parameters: (1) the Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which rules out interferences; (2) the Positivity or
Random Assignment, which states that the conditional probability of being assigned to treatment
is neither zero nor one; (3) the Ignorability Assumption, which rules out unobserved confounders:
s⊥y |,xI−k,v, t = 1, . . . , T.
Applied to the two-state model, with the states of ”non-employment” (NE) and ”employment”
(E) as response outcomes at time t+1, β1 measures the effect of the reforms in term of the prob-
ability that a non-employed worker at time t transits towards employment (E) at time t+1 or,
equivalently, remains in a state of non-employment if the model is estimated with NE as response
outcome. It should be noted that the estimated parameters of LPM must be interpreted as a
marginal effect of the exposure of a non-employed person to the labour market reforms on the
probability of transiting to a state of employment.
The linear probability model described by Equation (10) can easily be extended to account for
the three-state model which includes two different initial states t , non-employment, and temporary
employment, and three final states t+1, non-employment, temporary employment and permanent
employment. LPM estimates of the effects of the reforms are carried out equation by equation,
and the parameters and variables are those noted in Equation 10. In fact, following the model
specifications, although the effect of the reforms on work flows directly affects non-employed or
temporary workers, it only has an indirect effect on permanent contracts.
This model is used again when we consider the two temporary contracts of interest, separately,
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i.e. apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts. The difference is that, in the latter case, dummy
variable si,t captures the exposure to the reforms of a subject involved in apprenticeship or a
fixed-term contract, respectively, excluding transitions from or to other temporary contracts, but
considering the effects of variations in non-employment and permanent contracts.
Under ignorability, the causal parameters of the specification 10 can be estimated by the IPW
method5 in which a matching achievement of subject i is weighted by the inverse of the probability
of its observed treatment, i.e.
∏T
t=1 Pr(sit | xi,t,vi). Occasion-specific probabilities are usually
estimated through pooled logistic regression, that is, standard logistic regression applied to the
subject-occasion dataset (any subject contributes with one record for each occasion on which it is
observed). The vectors of observable time-varying and time un-varying individual characteristics xit
and vi which we include in this estimate, are: individual’s gender, age, highest degree of education
received (primary, secondary, tertiary), and monthly duration of present contract, together with
the already-mentioned three dummy variables, characterising individuals as first-time job-seekers,
unemployed persons on social security benefits, and long-term unemployed persons. The statistics
of exposed and non-exposed individuals to the labour market reforms, for the three-state model, are
listed in the Appendix.
It should be emphasised that the efficiency of the IPW estimator may be unsatisfactory when
the weights have high variability. In particular, subjects with tiny probabilities have large weights,
which increase the variance. Although a common method of improving efficiency is the use of
stabilised weights (Robins et al. 2000), here we use an augmented inverse-probability weighting
estimator which combines aspects of regression-adjustment and inverse-probability weighted meth-
ods to estimate potential-outcome means and average treatment effects. This estimator is shown
to be the double-robust estimator (Tsiatis 2006; Leon et al. 2003), which also has the advantage
of providing unbiased inferences when adjustments are made for selection effects by allowing for
different forms of model misspecification (Emsley et al. 2008).
5. Results
5.1. Preliminary: the validity of identification
To verify identification validity, exogeneity of labour market reforms is inferred. Decisions
concerning adoption of new contracts are inferred to be independent random events varying over
period, with no spillover effects. Note that regions or sectors with few entries into labour market
through apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts were those which had adopted the reform earlier.
Figure 5 shows tests for new apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts, comparing the transition
probabilities of being involved in these contracts for treated and non-treated samples. In particular,
5See, Robins et al. (2000).
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Fig. 5.— Percentage of transitions from fixed-term to permanent contracts.
we compare treated and non-treated regions when new apprenticeship contracts are analysed, and
treated and non-treated sectors for fixed-term contracts. Both panels show similar trends in the two
series before the new contracts came into force in 2005, supporting the validity of our identification
strategy.
5.2. Baseline estimates
We assess here the effect of the labour market reforms on non-employment and employment
states using the two-state and three-state models.
Table 3: Estimation results, two-states model
Non-employment Employment
Job creation
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Potential outcome means 0.873 *** 0.127 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
Number of observations 48373 48373
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallo-
cation, see text. Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 3 lists the results on job creation of LPM estimates according to the two-state model,
including estimated potential outcome means and average treatment effect for treated persons
exposed to the reforms.
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Table 4: Estimation results, three-states model
Non-employment Temporary Permanent
employment employment
a) Job creation
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.034 *** -0.032 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Potential outcome means 0.873 *** 0.061 *** 0.066 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 48373 48373 48373
b) Job reallocation (from Temporary employment)
Average treatment effect -0.058 *** 0.067 *** -0.009 **
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Potential outcome means 0.176 *** 0.625 *** 0.198 ***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Number of observations 16454 16454 16454
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that exposure to the labour market reforms produced a small
positive variation in new hirings of about 0.2%. This means that, because of the potential outcome
of the population not subjected to the reforms of 12.7%, we find a slight positive job creation effect.
However, this estimate cannot distinguish wherever this small effect on job creation comes
from new hirings in temporary or permanent employment. Table 4 lists estimates for these two
sub-markets (i.e. three-state model). Columns 2 and 3 (part of panel a) of Table 4 show that the
0.2% increase in the transition probability of entering the labour market (Table 3) is the result of
a substitution effect between temporary and permanent jobs. We estimate an increase of 3.4% in
the probability of moving to temporary employment after exposure to the reforms, which offsets
the reduction of 3.2% in the probability of moving to a permanent job.
The effects of the labour market reforms on the reallocation of employees (if they were already
in temporary employment) are listed in panel b) of Table 4. Column 1 of this table shows that
exposure to the reforms for workers who had previously had temporary jobs reduced the proba-
bility of leaving the labour market (5.8%). This effect was due to the significant increase in the
probability of staying in temporary employment (6.7%), limiting the reduction of transitions from
temporary to permanent employment to about 1%. These results were expected, since the reforms
relaxed the mandatory limits on temporary contracts, without reducing the termination costs of
permanent ones, generate incentives for firms to hire workers through temporary contracts and was
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in accordance with the findings by Haltiwanger et al. (2014). These estimates were also consistent
with the ones obtained by Centeno and Novo (2012) in Portugal.
Table 5: Estimation results, three-state model (Apprenticeships)
Non-employment Apprenticeship Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Average treatment effect -0.002 ** 0.144 *** -0.141 ***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
Potential outcome means 0.771 *** 0.061 *** 0.168 ***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Number of observations 4393 4393 4393
b) Job reallocation (from Apprenticeships)
Average treatment effect -0.039 *** 0.093 *** -0.053 ***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.016)
Potential outcome means 0.102 *** 0.698 *** 0.200 ***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.014)
Number of observations 3127 3127 3127
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors reported in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
To complete the baseline analysis, we replicated the estimates of the three-state model in
Tables 5 and 6 to examine separately the effects of the two contracts, apprenticeships and fixed-
term contracts, on job creation and job reallocation. We stress that Tables 5 and 6 were obtained
by considering the effects of variations in transitions of non-employment and permanent contracts
together with those in the specific temporary contracts.
Starting with apprenticeships, we estimate the effect of the reforms on job flows for young
people aged 15-29 who were eligible for this type of contract. Table 5 shows that the introduction
of apprenticeship reforms increased the probability of remaining in this temporary job by 14.4%, but
reduced the probability of signing permanent contracts by 14.2%. The importance of apprenticeship
contracts was also confirmed for young workers with apprenticeships at t-1. The increase due to
application of the reforms to new temporary contracts, even though more than 60% of these changes
were due to exit from permanent contracts, was 9%.
Table 6 shows the results of analysis for fixed-term contracts. The magnitude of their effects
on the measure of job creation is in line with that of Table 4 (around 4.0%). Note that these results
diverge from those proposed by Cappellari et al. (2012), who found a reduction in job creation after
the introduction of the new fixed-term contracts.
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Table 6: Estimation results, three-state model (Fixed-term)
Non-employment Fixed-term Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.040 *** -0.038 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Potential outcome means 0.903 *** 0.029 *** 0.069 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 41777 41777 41777
b) Job reallocation (from Fixed-term)
Average treatment effect -0.044 *** 0.106 *** -0.063 ***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Potential outcome means 0.195 *** 0.482 *** 0.323 ***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Number of observations 6287 6287 6287
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
When the estimates of job reallocation are accounted for, we show that the introduction of new
fixed-term contracts reduced by 10% the probability of moving to non-employment from temporary
jobs, but it also increased permanence in this state. The substitution effect between fixed-term
and permanent contracts, caused by the introduction of fixed-term contracts, appears with a 6.3%
reduction in the probability of moving from this employment state to a permanent job.
5.3. Focusing on subsamples of workers: a decomposition by age, gender and region
The target population of the labour market reforms in Italy also focused on disadvantaged
workers, such as young people, women, and job-seekers in the depressed areas of Southern Italy
(the ”Mezzogiorno”). In this section, we focus on these segments of the labour market, to assess
to what extent the reforms of 2001 and 2003 benefited the target population.
In the light of our previous results, we first examined whether young workers were affected
by the labour market reforms in the same way as prime (i.e., those aged > 30 and < 65) or older
workers. The span of the age class we chose (those aged 15-30) accounts for the upper limit of
the new apprenticeship contract, which was possible only for persons under 30 years of age. We
also decomposed our estimations by gender and region of residence, to examine the effects of the
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reforms on women and workers in the Mezzogiorno. Table 7 (panel a) lists the average treatment
effects of the reforms on the transition probabilities of workers, according to the three-state model.
Comparing the estimates with the three-state model in the baseline specification for job cre-
ation, we found a large increase in the transition probability of young workers entering the labour
market with temporary employment (7.2%) and a contrasting fall (7%) in the probability of entering
with permanent contracts. In addition, in the case of job reallocation, young workers in temporary
employment increased their probability of staying in this state after the reforms by 13.4%, i.e.,
more than double that of the full sample. It should be noted that the marked reduction in job
stability for young workers was only partially offset by the change in the probability of leaving the
labour market from temporary employment, which decreased by 6.5%.
The middle panel of Table 7 lists the effects of the labour market reforms according to gender.
For the female population, the comparison does not show significant differences in job creation with
respect to the full sample but, in the case of job reallocation, the increased probability of moving
to temporary contracts for women is partly due to a reduction of 2.4% in the transit to permanent
employment.
The estimates for the Mezzogiorno (bottom panel of Table 7) indicate a slight increase in job
creation effects (0.4% versus the Italian average of 0.2%). The transition probabilities for this area,
based on the effects of new contracts to workers in temporary employment, indicate growth of
9% in persisting temporary employment. As the increased probability of remaining in temporary
employment is fully offset by the reduced probability of moving to non-employment, enhancing
labour market flexibility did at least achieve the aim of alleviating the negative non-employment
trends in the Mezzogiorno.
The heterogeneous effects of the reforms are listed in Table 8 for apprenticeship contracts,
estimates being decomposed by gender and macro-areas, and in Table 9 for fixed-term contracts,
decomposed by age, gender and macro-areas. Although the estimates indicate that there is no
evidence of gender differences, the slight increase in the probability of apprenticeship contracts for
southern Italian workers, with respect to the means of the effects, were again due mainly to reduced
transitions to non-employment. This increase, in view of the fact that individuals had received
apprenticeship contracts in the previous year, confirmed that temporary employment favoured exit
from non-employment for those in depressed Italian regions.
Estimates of the shock due to the reform of fixed-term contracts also highlight interesting
evidence. First of all, compared with the baseline estimates, young workers aged 15-30 had a
significantly increased probability of entering the labour market with this type of contract, with
percentage points double those of the means of individuals who were non-employed. As regards
estimates based on job reallocation, the probability of young workers of staying in fixed-term
contracts increased by 13.4% , partly due to the reduced probability of remaining in a state of
non-employment. Instead, the estimates of the effects of the reforms for fixed-term contracts, de-
composed by gender, did not show differences from baseline estimates; in the case of decomposition
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Table 7: Estimation results, three-state model, by age, gender and region
Non-employment Temporary Permanent
employment employment
a) Job creation
Age 15-30
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.072 *** -0.070 ***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Potential outcome means 0.721 *** 0.177 *** 0.102 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of observations 10860 10860 10860
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.033 *** -0.031 ***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Potential outcome means 0.894 *** 0.056 *** 0.051 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 29250 29250 29250
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.004 *** 0.031 *** -0.026 ***
(0.001) (0.010) (0.010)
Potential outcome means 0.863 *** 0.052 *** 0.085 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of observations 17073 17073 17073
b) Job reallocation (from Temporary employment)
Age 15-30
Average treatment effect -0.065 *** 0.134 *** -0.069 ***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Potential outcome means 0.168 *** 0.620 *** 0.212 ***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of observations 9602 9602 9602
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.048 *** 0.072 *** -0.024 ***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.009)
Potential outcome means 0.177 *** 0.628 *** 0.196 ***
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of observations 8223 8223 8223
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.094 *** 0.092 *** 0.002
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013)
Potential outcome means 0.264 *** 0.563 *** 0.173 ***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Number of observations 3680 3680 3680
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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by macro-areas, we again found a reduction in the probability of southern Italian workers of being
non-employed, which was higher than the mean effect, confirming that, in this case, the reforms
were effective.
5.4. Robustness
Let us now assess the robustness of our findings. A first check involves the possibility that
effects on entry into and exit from the labour market or transitions between employment states are
affected by the composition of contracts, due to the overlap of ”co.co.co” contracts and work on
project contracts (co.co.pro) after the reform of 2003. To address this, we restricted the length of
our analysis and carried out estimates starting from 2004.
A second robustness check concerns possible effects due to Law 247/2007, which only came
into force on April 1 2009. To check for this, we restricted the estimate of transition probabilities
to 2008.
Table 10 lists the estimates of models with restricted samples. The average treatment effect
on transition probabilities did not show any differences in the effect of labour market reforms with
respect to previous estimates, except for the magnitude of some coefficients on job reallocation
equations. The transition probabilities of moving to temporary employment increased slightly in the
restricted sample 2003-2008 (8.3%), without any significant variation in transitions to permanent
employment, which falls of about 1.4%. This led us to conclude that the increase in transition
probabilities of subjects with temporary contracts, which we found in the baseline estimates, were
driven by changes in temporary contracts. The estimates in panels b) and c) of Table 10 confirm
the magnitude of the effects in apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts.
6. Conclusive Remarks
In this paper, we estimate the effects of the labour market reforms aimed at enhancing flexibility
implemented in Italy in 2001 and 2003, on transition probabilities across various labour market
states. We use hitherto unexploited administrative data merged with other official sources of
information (AD-SILC data-set) to construct measures of worker flows between employment states
according to temporary and permanent contracts. This procedure gives us a consistent set of facts
from which we can identify employment entry/exit probabilities as well as job reallocation for
workers in temporary employment.
Using our estimates, we find a slight positive creation of new jobs imputed to the reforms.
Matching previous literature, we find a substitution effect between temporary and permanent con-
tracts, i.e., a large increase in the number of temporary contracts, offset by a reduction in permanent
contracts. The effect of workers’ enhanced flexibility is highlighted when we estimate the probabil-
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Table 8: Estimation results, three-states model (Apprenticeship),
by gender and region
Non-employment Apprenticeships Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.001 0.131 *** -0.130 ***
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Potential outcome means 0.786 *** 0.060 *** 0.154 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Number of observations 2236 2236 2236
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.003 ** 0.154 *** -0.151 ***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
Potential outcome means 0.795 *** 0.030 *** 0.175 ***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.008)
Number of observations 2129 2129 2129
b) Job reallocation (from Apprenticeship)
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.027 *** 0.104 *** -0.077 ***
(0.009) (0.024) (0.023)
Potential outcome means 0.092 *** 0.693 *** 0.215 ***
(0.011) (0.022) (0.020)
Number of observations 1407 1407 1407
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.098 *** 0.145 *** -0.047
(0.025) (0.042) (0.037)
Potential outcome means 0.213 *** 0.597 *** 0.190 ***
(0.028) (0.039) (0.033)
Number of observations 538 538 538
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text. Robust
standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Estimation results, three-state model (Fixed-term),
by age, gender and region
Non-employment Fixed-term Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Age 15-30
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.072 *** -0.070 ***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Potential outcome means 0.763 *** 0.104 *** 0.132 ***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Number of observations 6097 6097 6097
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.042 *** -0.040 ***
(0.000) (0.005) (0.005)
Potential outcome means 0.922 *** 0.027 *** 0.052 ***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of observations 25539 25539 25539
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.004 *** 0.040 *** -0.035 ***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.013)
Potential outcome means 0.886 *** 0.025 *** 0.089 ***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of observations 14921 14921 14921
b) Job reallocation (from Fixed-term)
Age 15-30
Average treatment effect -0.065 *** 0.134 *** -0.069 ***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.008)
Potential outcome means 0.210 *** 0.477 *** 0.313 ***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Number of observations 2401 2401 2401
Female gender
Average treatment effect -0.034 *** 0.114 *** -0.080 ***
(0.006) (0.016) (0.015)
Potential outcome means 0.192 *** 0.490 *** 0.319 ***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of observations 3178 3178 3178
Mezzogiorno
Average treatment effect -0.086 *** 0.113 *** -0.027
(0.011) (0.021) (0.020)
Potential outcome means 0.281 *** 0.462 *** 0.257 ***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.015)
Number of observations 1683 1683 1683
Notes: For definiition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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ities of transition with temporary employment as initial state. In this case, estimates for the full
sample indicate that the labour market reforms increased the number of transitions to temporary
contracts by almost 7%. We also find a large range of transition probabilities due to the reforms
for apprenticeships and fixed-term contracts, especially in the depressed areas of southern Italian
regions, only partly imputed to the decrease of the flows of permanent contracts.
These facts apply to young workers, who undergo persisting temporary employment higher
that given by the mean effect. However, the transition probabilities for men and women explain
only a few of these differences. In this work, we did not examine either the factors causing estimated
transitions to temporary employment or the negative or non-significant effects of labour market
reforms on transitions to permanent employment. However, net of some estimation disturbing
factors regarding the influence of the recent financial crisis, we show that our findings are valid for
several groups of workers and are robust over the sample used.
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Table 10: Robustness checks
a) Three-state model
Non-employment Temporary Permanent
employment employment
a) Job creation
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.034 *** -0.032 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.004 *** 0.036 *** -0.033 ***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.008)
b) Job reallocation (from Temporary employment)
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.058 *** 0.067 *** -0.009 **
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.067 *** 0.083 *** -0.014 **
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007)
b) Apprenticeships
Non-employment Apprenticeships Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.002 ** 0.144 *** -0.141 ***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.003 ** 0.152 *** -0.150 ***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
b) Job reallocation (from Apprenticeships)
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.039 *** 0.093 *** -0.053 ***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.016)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.037 *** 0.108 *** -0.071 ***
(0.008) (0.018) (0.017)
Continued
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c) Fixed-term contracts
Non-employment Fixed-term Permanent
employment
a) Job creation
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.002 *** 0.040 *** -0.038 ***
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.004 *** 0.048 *** -0.044 ***
(0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
b) Job reallocation (from Fixed-term)
Restricted sample: 2004-2010
Average treatment effect -0.044 *** 0.106 *** -0.063 ***
(0.005) (0.011) (0.011)
Restricted sample: 2003-2008
Average treatment effect -0.045 *** 0.119 *** -0.074 ***
(0.005) (0.014) (0.013)
Notes: For definition of measures of job creation and job reallocation, see text.
Robust standard errors in brackets; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Appendix A: Summary statistics for control variables in the three state
model).
Variable Full-sample Control Sample Treated Sample
Unemployed persons receiving S.S.B. 0.018 0.016 0.025
First-time job seekers 0.003 0.003 0.006
Long-term unemployed persons 0.357 0.387 0.209
Monthly contract duration 22.674 24.345 14.543
Gender (Female = 2) 1.498 1.501 1.488
Age
15-24 0.110 0.058 0.360
25-34 0.239 0.214 0.360
35-44 0.265 0.285 0.171
45-54 0.225 0.254 0.085
55-64 0.161 0.189 0.024
Education
Primary 0.067 0.073 0.038
Secondary 0.785 0.766 0.878
Tertiary 0.009 0.010 0.006
Sector
Agriculture 0.004 0.004 0.001
Energy 0.007 0.008 0.003
Extractive sector 0.027 0.031 0.006
Metal manufac-
tory
0.109 0.118 0.064
Manufactory 0.096 0.088 0.130
Construction 0.057 0.044 0.118
Commerce 0.137 0.104 0.292
Communications
and Transport
0.029 0.028 0.033
Credit and Bank-
ing
0.087 0.084 0.099
Other services 0.054 0.061 0.025
Region
Piedmont 0.063 0.064 0.055
Valle d’Aosta 0.012 0.012 0.015
Lombardy 0.128 0.134 0.096
Bolzano-Bozen 0.023 0.024 0.018
Trento 0.017 0.015 0.026
Veneto 0.098 0.098 0.098
Friuli Venezia
Giulia
0.040 0.040 0.040
Liguria 0.034 0.033 0.040
Emilia-Romagna 0.069 0.069 0.073
Tuscany 0.071 0.068 0.088
Umbria 0.042 0.040 0.050
Marche 0.054 0.049 0.079
Lazio 0.069 0.068 0.072
Abruzzo 0.028 0.029 0.025
Molise 0.014 0.014 0.012
Campania 0.068 0.069 0.063
Puglia 0.048 0.048 0.047
Basilicata 0.022 0.024 0.015
Calabria 0.025 0.027 0.014
Sicily 0.044 0.046 0.033
Sardinia 0.031 0.029 0.042
Notes: S.S.B.: social security benefits.
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